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To begin, I must express my gratitude to both Emily Crookston and David Kelley for 
their excellent commentaries on my book.1  Non-academics often don’t understand this, but it is 
always an honor to have colleagues criticize one’s work.  I am honored.2  I hope my replies here 
do justice to their concerns. 
Crookston begins her commentary by noting that Toleration3 would have been better with 
answers to “the following three questions: (1) Why is the harm principle the right principle upon 
which to base a theory of toleration? (2) How is Cohen thinking of the concept of volenti? (p. x) 
Is interference (i.e., the abandonment of toleration) ever morally required by the harm 
principle?”  (p. x).  She is right, and I address these questions below in Sections 2, 3, and 4. 
Responding to Crookston’s questions takes up the bulk of this essay.  While she and 
Kelley both offered compliments and encouragement for further thought, Crookston’s direct 
questions demanded substantial responses.  By happy contrast, my response to Kelley can be 
briefer.  This is at least partly because I agree with much of what he says, and the way he frames 
                                       
1 Emily Crookston, “Comments on Andrew Jason Cohen’s Toleration,” Reason Papers 38, no. 2 (Winter 
2016), pp. x-xx; David Kelley, “Comments on Toleration, by Andrew Jason Cohen,” Reason Papers 38, no. 2 
(Winter 2016), pp. xx-xx. Hereafter, all citations to these articles will be parenthetical in the text. 
 
2 I am also grateful to Shawn Klein and Jen Baker for asking me to participate in an author-meets-critics 
section at the 2016 Central Division American Philosophical Association and to Shawn and Carrie-Ann 
Biondi for asking Emily and David to write up their commentaries and for allowing me to reply.  Again, it is 
an honor.  Finally, I appreciate useful feedback from Daniel Shapiro, who read a draft of my replies. 
3 Andrew Jason Cohen, Toleration (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2014). 
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the three issues he raises leaves me pleased that the book was so well understood (by both he and 
Crookston).  His three issues have to do with “the link between toleration and relativism,” the 
way I distinguish “the concepts of toleration and endurance,” and a “question about moral 
toleration” (p. x).  Despite much agreement, there are points of contention and I try to make my 
position clearer by responding below to Kelley in Sections 6, 7, and 8. 
 
2. Why Is the Harm Principle the Right Principle? 
Regarding Crookston’s first question, it’s important that “there is no denying the intuitive 
force of harm or a threat of harm as a reason to interfere with the actions of others” (p. x).  This 
means defense of that claim is not what is at issue.  What is at issue is showing that only harm or 
threat of harm is a reason to interfere.  Perhaps more importantly, Crookston is right that my 
view will leave us tolerating immoral behavior (p. x).  She likely thinks that this implication is 
more problematic than I do.  I think there are all sorts of immoral behaviors we ought to tolerate.  
For one simple example, I think it is immoral for individuals to waste their lives (perhaps by 
abusing drugs every day or spending their lives counting blades of grass instead of being 
productive), but I think we must tolerate such behavior unless it harms another. 
Crookston’s concern with my example of Floating Flo is fair and common, but absent 
further argument that we must not tolerate someone’s non-harmful failure to save Flo, I cannot 
endorse coercion of Samaritan behavior.  My leaving Flo in the water—by clear contrast with my 
causing her to be in the water—does not, I think, set back her interests but leaves them set (back) 
where they were.  I agree that doing so is likely wrongful, but as I don’t set back her interests, I 
don’t harm her, and hence interference with my (admittedly immoral) behavior is unwarranted.  
As Crookston notes (p. x), Kit Wellman’s arguments for the Samaritan principle are persuasive, 
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but they are not definitive, in my view.4  Of course, I agree we should act as Samaritans, but that 
is not the issue here; rather, at issue is whether we can be forced to act as Samaritans (or 
punished if we do not). I think we cannot. 
Importantly, one need not endorse the Samaritan principle to think interference is 
permitted when “social ills like poverty are . . . the result of wrongful behavior by individuals or 
sets of individuals” (pp. x-x).5  When poverty—clearly a setback of interests to the impoverished 
individual—is the result of such behavior, the harm principle allows interference to rectify that 
harm.  That rectification will benefit the person who is impoverished, but that does not mean—in 
contrast to what Crookston suggests—that a benefit-to-others principle or a Samaritan principle 
is at play.  To be clear, where poverty is not caused by a harm—whether intentional or not6—
interference with others to eliminate it would not be warranted, though of course those others can 
choose to give charitable assistance.  Nonetheless, on my own view—which I will not defend 
here—much of the poverty that exists in the U.S. is caused by harms; if I am right about that, 
interference to eliminate it would be warranted. 
Nothing I have said thus far really answers Crookston’s query.  What I hoped to do in the 
book was, in fact, a bit less ambitious than proving that “the harm principle [is] the right 
principle upon which to base a theory of toleration.”  My aim was only to demonstrate the 
desirability of endorsing the strict harm principle over a less strict version that would incorporate 
one of the other standard jurisprudential principles I discuss: the offense principle, the principle 
                                       
4 I find Wellman’s view on this more persuasive for the topic he addresses—state legitimacy—than when 
applied to other topics. 
 
5 I assume that the concern is with absolute poverty.  That is, the concern is with people not having enough to 
live, not with their having even substantially less then others (i.e., relative poverty). 
6 On p. x, Crookston suggests that all immoral behavior is intentional.  I do not think this is the case, though 
whether it is may depend on what intentionality is.  I cannot address that here. 
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of legal moralism, the principle of legal paternalism, and the benefit-to-others principle (of 
which the Samaritan principle is a version).  However, showing that X is preferable to Y is not 
conclusive reason to adopt X.  While I think I show that the strict harm principle is preferable to 
those other principles—by describing what each would commit us to—and I hope that many will 
follow me in adopting it, Crookston is right to want a more definitive defense of the principle.  I 
offer that in a new book in progress, tentatively titled Toleration and Freedom from Harm: 
Liberalism Reconceived (Routledge Press).  The defense is two-pronged; the first prong is more 
original and, I think, more definitive.  It is the explication of a better understanding of freedom 
then heretofore has been defended—an understanding of freedom as freedom from harm, which 
is conceptually connected to the harm principle such that endorsing the latter is protecting and 
promoting the former.  The second prong makes use of Ricardian economics to show that 
accepting the harm principle as the sole normative principle of toleration benefits us all.  I hope 
Crookston and our readers will await that work for a final response.  
 
3. Volenti 
When Crookston moves to consider her second issue, it becomes clear that she is less 
concerned with how I would flesh out the concept of volenti than she is with two other issues, 
both of which I find unproblematic.  The first issue is simply that in some cases, it may be easiest 
to reduce or avoid harms in a society by making an activity illegal even if some people could 
genuinely consent to the activity and thus not be harmed by it.  Here, Crookston considers cases 
of voluntary cannibalism (p. x; looking at p. 83 of Toleration) and cases of risky behavior like 
riding a motorcycle without a helmet (p. x).  The second issue here is about how I would respond 
to cases where the consent or voluntary participation comes about because of how an individual 
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is raised.  If an individual is raised to see herself as subservient and then consents to lead a life of 
subservience, some—perhaps including Crookston, though this is not clear—will deny that her 
consent should be taken as removing whatever wrongfulness is otherwise involved.  Those 
taking such a view do not (usually) deny the importance of volenti; instead, they deny that the 
individual in question is capable of giving genuine consent because of how they were raised.  
To take the first issue first, I offered a response to this sort of worry in an earlier paper on 
the topic: for some sorts of activities, where an agent is likely to risk danger to herself, “a test of 
competence would be mandatory. I do not think such a test is completely implausible. . . . Still, if 
the test is impossible or too expensive, that might justify legal prohibition.”7  Putting the point 
differently, because law is a blunt instrument, we may find that efficiency concerns push us to 
permit interference in types of activities that we should otherwise tolerate in at least some cases.  
This is not a concession I would make lightly, if ever.  I am not at all persuaded we should make 
it for the sorts of cases Crookston discusses. 
Regarding the second issue here, Crookston says that her “concern . . . is that the origin 
of our interests matters when deciding whether someone has been harmed. A discussion of 
mixed or impure cases of consent, like . . . [the case of polygamy], would clarify Cohen’s view 
of volenti and how it removes wrongfulness” (p. x).  I think Crookston is mistaken here to think 
this is about how I construe volenti—or, if it is, she seems to be asking whether I would endorse 
a view of volenti such that only fully rational consent matters, where “fully rational consent” is 
the sort of consent that a fully rational agent, shorn of any empirical limitations, would be 
capable of.  Here I rely on work in progress, where I defend my view of freedom from harm 
mentioned above.  Simply put, I am concerned to protect individuals as they are and not as they 
                                       
7 Andrew Jason Cohen, “What the Liberal State Should Tolerate Within Its Borders,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 37 (2007), pp. 491-92. 
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might be thought to be or as they (supposedly) ought to be.8  While some political philosophers 
today rely on a notion of ideal rational consent—think of the consent one might find provided 
behind John Rawls’s “veil of ignorance”9—my concern is with actual people.  On my view, 
respecting freedom from harm requires respecting persons as they are.  This means my 
liberalism requires toleration of people acting on their own actual wishes, not ideal wishes (that 
is, wishes determined by some fully rational agent which they are perhaps capable of being, but 
are not).  To be clear, then, I do believe we must tolerate polygamy and many other practices that 
people engage in willfully, even though we believe (perhaps correctly) that at least some of them 
would not do so if they were raised in more reason- and autonomy-conducive ways.10  What 
matters is only whether they—as the actual persons they are—rationally consent.  (That is a 
question for positive psychology, not normative philosophy.) 
  
4. Does the Harm Principle Ever Require Interference? 
Now to consider Crookston’s last question: Does the harm principle ever require 
interference?  My inclination is to answer in the negative; indeed, I take it that my stance that the 
harm principle provides only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for interference is 
standard among Mill scholars.  There is one limit to that negative answer, namely, because the 
harm principle indicates that an individual can be interfered with—that is, have his freedom 
limited—if he harms another, anyone endorsing the principle has prima facie reason to cause no 
harm.  That is, since I believe I can be interfered with should I cause harm to another, I ought not 
                                       
8 Peter Balint takes a similar stance in his Respecting Toleration: Traditional Liberalism and Contemporary 
Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
9 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971). 
 
10 This response is also present in my 2007. 
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harm another, because I do not want to be interfered with.  Hence, the harm principle indirectly, 
and as a practical matter, offers each of us (and governing bodies) a practical injunction to do no 
harm.  This is an old principle in practical ethics: primum non nocere (first do no harm).  Some 
might think of this as an interference with individual freedom.  More precisely, it is a normative 
limit to descriptive freedom and no limit to normative freedom properly understood. 
Crookston suggests there may be times when “two people’s interests conflict and non-
interference is simply not an option” (p. x) and that while I claim that “justice requires that we 
never interfere where toleration is mandated” (p. 51), it may instead be “the other way around . . 
. that justice requires that we interfere where there is wrongdoing and toleration is not mandated” 
(p. x).  I gather that what Crookston has in mind here is the perennial worrisome sort of case 
where a governmental body must favor one party over another—where doing nothing is itself 
taking a stance.  Perhaps the most discussed case of this sort is a law allowing abortions. Such a 
law is tantamount to the government siding with pro-choice advocates over pro-life advocates.  
The latter, after all, do not merely think abortion is wrong for them, but that it is always and 
everywhere something that must not be permitted.  They do not get their way if abortion is 
legally permitted.  Some may think, moreover, that abortion is wrongful even if no one is harmed 
and also think that toleration is not mandated.  The latter, of course, is inconsistent with the harm 
principle; if there is no harm, toleration is mandated.  Let’s look, though, at Crookston’s 
example.11   
                                       
11 The most likely candidate for a harm in abortion is the fetus.  Yet a fetus cannot have the sort of interests 
you and I have, and so has far fewer interests to be wrongfully set back.  I would grant that the fetus has an 
interest in not suffering.  That interest can presumably be wrongfully set back—there would then be a harm 
that prima facie warrants interference.  If abortion could be made such that the fetus did not suffer (or suffer 
wrongfully), it would not be harmful and interference would not be warranted.  Of course, it may be that in 
some cases someone else is harmed—if, for example, the mother is a contractually obligated surrogate. 
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Crookston does not raise the issue of abortion.  She discusses slavery, instead.  She writes 
that “Cohen would argue that slavery is a quintessential case of where toleration should not be 
tolerated, since slaves’ interests are wrongly set back” (p. x).  In fact, though, I have previously 
defended the claim that voluntary slavery must be tolerated12 —that is, if someone with full 
information genuinely consents to be enslaved, the enslavement must be tolerated even if her 
interests are (or appear to be) set back.  In such a case, the enslavement must be tolerated. 
Of course, the real concern is not with voluntary enslavement but with involuntary 
enslavement.  In the American case, for example, it would be absurd to think that the people 
kidnapped from their homes in Africa, taken from their family and friends, shipped to the 
Americas and sold to the highest bidders, consented.  It would be equally absurd to think that 
their children, born while they were slaves, consented to be slaves.  In the American case, that is, 
enslavement was quintessentially not voluntary.  It was harmful and ought not to have been 
tolerated.  Thinking about it that way, interfering with slavery is akin to interfering with murder.  
It’s true that in both cases someone’s interests are being set back—the slaveholder and the 
murderer.  In neither case does that raise a serious objection. In both cases, it is simply a 
recognition that the harm principle indicates that interference is warranted when there is harm.  
This is actually too quick. 
Crookston rightly points out that ending slavery benefited (at least) one group—those 
formerly enslaved—and cost another group—the former slave owners.  That second group does 
have their interests set back, because they suddenly do not have legal property they previously 
had.  I just said that this doesn’t raise to the level of a serious objection, but I was being too 
quick because the situation in the U.S. was not merely one set of persons enslaving another then 
                                       
12 See my 2007, esp. pp. 485 ff. 
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being forced to release them.  The situation, rather, was one wherein the entire legal system was 
complicit in the system of slavery.  Not only would a slaveholder not have been forced to release 
a slave, but he would have found help from government agents in regaining a slave who ran 
away.  The legal system promoted buying and selling human beings.  What this means here—
and I take it that this gets to Crookston’s point—is that the slaveholders had genuine legal 
property removed from their possession when slaves were emancipated.  They thus suffered a 
setback to interests—immoral though they be.  We could say the state set back the very interests 
of the slaveholders that it previously promoted.  Some might think this was also wrongful—not 
because emancipation was wrongful, but because the state allowed slave-holders to develop 
expectations that they would retain legal property in other people.13  If this is right, it may well 
be that the state should compensate the slaveholders.  It does not mean that the system of slavery 
should have been continued.  As with the murder case and simple (non-governmentally 
endorsed) enslavement case, ending harms is permissible. 
 
5. Transition 
I should admit, before turning in the next section to David Kelley’s comments, that my 
view does not provide answers to all of the questions Crookston raises.  She wants to know how 
we are “ever to justify interfering with one group’s interests in order to promote the others, if 
there is no consensus about whether some action is wrong.”  As I say in the new work, we should 
admit that it is often difficult to determine whether a wrong is present or if interests have been set 
back, but we should also realize that there are tokens of obvious wrongs and obvious cases of 
                                       
13 These expectations would be illegitimate, but because of state involvement, would seem to the slave-holders 
as legitimate.  In any case, because the state was responsible for the presence of those expectations, it bears 
responsibility.  David Boonin’s Should Race Matter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) provides 
an excellent discussion of these issues. 
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interests being set back.  Perhaps more importantly, we should not shy away from the difficult 
work.  We can use the tokens of obvious harms (and tokens of cases obviously lacking harms) to 
help by reasoning analogically (as one would expect in judicial cases).  Given that there are 
many easy cases (with tokens of obvious harm and obvious lack of harm), it is a virtue of my 
(Feinbergian) account that it allows us to separate the easy from the difficult cases and pushes us 
to do the difficult normative work in the latter before concluding that a harm is present or absent.   
 
6. Toleration and Relativism 
Taking Kelley’s first point first, as I understand him, Kelley and I agree that belief in 
relativism is a problem.  He may think I offer toleration as a solution to some problems that 
relativist thinking causes.  I didn’t intend to do that, but I think it does.  In fact, I think it does 
more, as I explain here. 
Kelley thinks we do not need toleration—he often uses the term “tolerance”14—to deal 
with “those who differ from us in race, sex, ethnicity,” etc.  Instead, he says, we need rationality 
(p. xx).  He makes something of a case for this claim by noting that “[t]here is nothing for a 
white person to tolerate in one whose skin is black” just as there is nothing to tolerate in someone 
who is blond (p. xx).  At root, I agree.  To tolerate X, there must be something about X that one 
opposes, and to oppose someone because of his hair or skin color seems clearly irrational.  I 
would very much like to live in a society where people were always rational about such things.  
Unfortunately, we don’t live in that world.  In the world we do live in, some people will be 
rational about such things and some will not.  My hope is that until we live in a world where 
                                       
14 Indeed, he misquotes me as using the term (e.g., Kelley, “Comments on Toleration,” p. xx, quoting my 
Toleration, p. 2).  On my view, as Kelley notes, toleration is a behavioral matter; tolerance is a virtue or 
attitude.  See Andrew Jason Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” Ethics 115, no. 1 (2004), pp. 76-78. 
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everyone is rational about such things, those who are not will tolerate those they irrationally 
oppose.  Toleration can be used by those who are less than rational.  Even those who are 
irrational about something can tolerate it. 
Now step back from this point and reconsider the issue of relativism.  Kelley and I both 
oppose relativism, as should all critical thinkers.  However, toleration as an important moral and 
political project well pre-dates the rise in relativist thinking.  Toleration, to my mind, is central to 
the Enlightenment project of classical liberal thought, a project that I think is inherently opposed 
to relativism.  Indeed, its roots go back to Saint Augustine, hardly an advocate of relativist 
thinking.  However, Augustine gave up on toleration because he saw what he thought of as the 
Catholic Church’s successful ending of the Donatist heresy by  means that did not require 
toleration.15  It may well be that Augustine and the Catholic Church were not being rational, but 
if so, such a claim needs defense.  (Whether they were rational or not depends, I believe, on what 
their goal was.  If the goal is to rid the world of a religious sect, non-toleration may be rational.)   
Importantly, they took themselves to be rational and objectively—even absolutely—in the right; 
they would have no truck with relativism.  That makes my point: toleration is not merely 
opposed to relativism.  It is also opposed to objectivist and absolutist thinking that leads to harm 
(whether such thinking is correct or mistaken). 
The ideal world that Kelley and I both seek is a world wherein all think and act rationally 
and where this never leads one to harm another.  In that world, identity politics and toleration 
will not be important.  Indifference to things that do not (objectively) matter to us will rule.17   
Unfortunately, that world will not emerge in our lifetimes. 
                                       
15 See my Toleration, pp. 134-35. 
 
17 See my Toleration, pp. 155-56. 
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7. Toleration and Endurance 
I have very little to say in response to Kelley’s thoughts regarding the relationship 
between toleration and endurance.  I agree with much of what he says, but would caution that 
even if it’s true that his analysis of endurance “subsumes” my analysis of toleration (p. xx), there 
are instances of human persons enduring others that are different from persons tolerating others.  
With Kelley, I would tolerate the relativist egalitarian.  Perhaps I would also endure him.  By 
contrast, though, a prisoner likely endures his jailor but does not tolerate her.  He would escape if 
he could, but cannot, and so endures.  Perhaps toleration is a specific type of endurance.  We 
might even say, for example, that “while the prisoner merely endures his jailor, we do not merely 
endure, but also tolerate, the relativist egalitarian.”  To return to my 2004 article that Kelley 
cites, the difference seems to be that “toleration is something we must do for the right reasons 
such that one endures what one (believes one) has to; one tolerates what one (believes one) 
should.”18  When we merely endure, we are like the shade-tolerant plant in Kelley’s example or 
the concrete on my driveway, which is also shade-tolerant. When we tolerate, by contrast, 
something more—our reason—is involved. 
 
8. Moral Toleration 
Finally, with respect to the issue of moral toleration, Kelley asks two clarificatory 
questions.  First, he asks whether moral condemnation amounts to interference.  To know 
whether it does, though, we must know what it is.  I know various people who I think hold 
morally bad ideas but who I do not seek to correct. The ideas I am thinking of are widely 
                                       
18 Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” pp. 72-73. 
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accepted and I reasonably believe that my explanations as to why they are bad will make no 
difference, so I (usually) keep my condemnation to myself.  I think it’s clear that my 
condemnation in such cases is not interference.  In other cases, it is possible that someone might 
state condemnation forcefully and in a way that embarrasses the condemned person and stops 
him from doing as he would.  That may well be interference, and may thus be impermissible 
according to the harm principle.19  In between, of course, are cases where I present my 
condemnation calmly and the other person is persuaded by my arguments not to do as he would 
have; in those cases of rational persuasion we may want to say that I interfered or we may not.  I 
take no stand on that issue; it is a question of conceptual analysis only.  If it counts as 
interference, it is permissible nonetheless; rational persuasion is always permissible. 
Kelley’s second clarificatory question here is whether disliking Sam’s views amounts to 
disliking Sam.  Here, I tend to agree (once again) with Kelley: “I cannot justify that judgment 
solely on the basis of what he believes.”  I would note, though, that many people would make 
that judgment nonetheless.  I would also add that one might dislike someone even when one does 
not dislike or disapprove of that person’s views.  Indeed, one may find oneself in complete 
agreement with another person and still dislike that person.  I would not claim that this was fully 
rational, but it is not necessarily irrational. 
Kelley next asks whether we should tolerate his denouncing and ostracizing Sam, whose 
views Kelley dislikes.  He also correctly anticipates my answer: mere denunciation is to be 
tolerated, but ostracizing need not be (assuming that it is harmful).  Kelley thinks this view 
mistaken because “such actions [the ostracism] are grounded in the moral judgment” and the 
“purpose of moral judgment is to guide our actions toward other people, so it is not clear why we 
                                       
19 Ibid., pp. 85-87. 
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would refrain from” the ostracizing action.  My view here is simple: Even if the purpose of moral 
judgment is to guide our actions toward others—on my view this is only one purpose of moral 
judgment—it would not entail that just any action we choose as a result of that judgment is 
permissible or such that it must be tolerated.  If Kelley decided to water board Sam, we would 
have reason to interfere.  My view makes sense out of both; harm is the only thing that justifies 
interference.  Waterboarding harms, so interference is permissible.  If ostracism harms, 
interference is permissible.  (Whether ostracism harms, in different sorts of cases, I can’t take up 
here.) 
It may be that Kelley believes that certain sorts of actions—ostracism in some cases, for 
example—are rationally connected to a moral judgment such that failing to take that action 
indicates one did not actually have the morally condemning judgment.  If this were true, then 
rationality might be thought to require the actions in question—that is, non-tolerating actions like 
ostracism—must be permissible.  This line of argument might be thought a problem for the harm 
principle, but I do not see why.  First, even if the action is rationally connected to the judgment, 
the two are clearly conceptually distinct and we can fail to tolerate one without even considering 
the other.  Second, I admit to difficulty understanding why failing to take a particular action 
would indicate one did not actually have the morally condemning judgment, especially where the 
action in question would also cause harm (which one opposes) or where one is akratic.  Perhaps 
this brings us back to Crookston’s point that there are times “where two people’s interests 
conflict and non-interference is simply not an option.”  Here we either tolerate Sam or we 
tolerate Kelley’s non-toleration of Sam—doing both is impossible.  Of course, that is not quite 
right: it may be that we can tolerate both, though that would also leave one of the two getting 
what he wants and the other losing out.  If Kelley has the power to ostracize Sam and we tolerate 
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both, he gets what he wants and Sam does not.  Still, if what Kelley proposes would harm Sam, 
we may not need to tolerate his actions.20 
 
9. Conclusion 
Writing this response has been helpful.  It serves, for me, as a bridge between Toleration 
and Toleration and Freedom from Harm.  I did not anticipate that, but probably should have.  
Crookston and Kelley rightly pushed me on issues that I either failed to address at all in 
Toleration or did not address clearly enough.  Hopefully, what I say here will help with the latter 
and also whet everyone’s appetite for what I will say about the former in Toleration and 
Freedom from Harm. 
                                       
20 See my Toleration, pp. 89ff. See also my “What the Liberal State Should Tolerate Within Its Borders,” pp. 
479-513. 
